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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal raises the issue whether, where a 
construction company employee sues a railroad alleging 
injuries to himself as a passenger in his employerfs truck 
when it was driven by a co-employee into the side of a train 
at a grade crossing, the railroad by third-party complaint 
may enforce a right of indemnity against the employer for 
negligence of the co-employee, or whether the ordinary right 
of indemnity among tortfeasors is barred if the employer has 
paid workmenfs compensation to the plaintiff employee. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, Honorable Ernest Baldwin, 
Jra, determined that a third-party complaint is barred in 
such circumstances, and granted the employer's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the railroad's Third-Party Complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The present appeal seeks reversal of the ruling of 
the Third District Court, and an order reinstating the Third-
Party Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Complaint alleges that on August 21, 1973, a 
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i 
truck in which plaintiff was a passenger was struck by a 
train operated by defendant railroad at the 90th South 
Street crossing in Salt Lake City, and that plaintiff was 
injured. Plaintiff alleges, and defendants deny, that the 
collision was caused by negligent operation of the train 
and failure of crossing signals to work. Plaintiff concedes 
that the truck belonged to plaintiff's employer, defendant-
respondent DeWayne Construction Company, and was driven by 
a co-employee, and that plaintiff and his co-employee were 
then on the employer's business. Plaintiff further concedes 
' that the truck struck the side of the train approximately 80 
feet back from the front of the engine, that it was a clear 
day and there was an unobstructed view of the crossing for 
a substantial distance, that the road and the truck were in 
good condition, and that plaintiff has no personal knowledge 
whether train and crossing signals operated properly. State-
ments taken from different witnesses, and from the same 
witnesses at different times, indicate some conflict regarding 
whether all of the crossing signals were operating, and 
whether the train blew its whistle. Plaintiff has collected 
$6,599.89 in workmen's compensation from his employer, 
defendant-respondent DeWayne Construction Company. The driver 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the truck died. His representative has not been joined 
in this action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT RAILROAD HAS A RIGHT TO HAVE DETERMINED 
THE JOINT LIABILITY, IF ANY, OF PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER, 
AND A RIGHT TO INDEMNITY THEREFOR. 
Defendant railroad asserts that it was not in any 
manner negligent in this case, and is not liable to plaintiff 
for any injuries sustained. Given the conceded facts, it 
appears that the collision involved was proximately caused 
by the negligence of defendant-respondent's employee driver 
in the course of defendant-respondent's business. While it 
seems unlikely to defendant railroad that a jury would find 
that the collision was due to negligence, without also finding 
that a substantial part of such negligence was imputable to 
defendant-respondent, it is possible that jury would accord 
a part of such negligence to defendant railroad. In short, 
it appears that if the collision alleged by plaintiff was due 
to negligence, defendant railroad is at most a joint tort-
feasor with defendant-respondent. 
The right of contribution and indemnity exists 
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between joint tortfeasors in Utah. In order for one joint 
tortfeasor to assert such rights against another, of course, 
it is necessary to join the other and have the relative 
liabilities determined. 
Section 78-27-39, UTAH CODE ANN., provides: 
"The right of contribution shall exist among 
joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall 
not be entitled to a money judgment for contribution 
until he has, by payment, discharged the common 
liability or more than his prorata share thereof.11 
Section 78-27-41, UTAH CODE ANN., provides: 
"Nothing in this act shall affect: 
(1) The common-law liability of the several 
joint tort-feasors to have judgment recovered, and 
payment made, from them individually by the injured 
person for the whole injury. However, the recovery 
of a judgment by the injured person against one 
joint tort-feasor does not discharge the other joint 
tort-feasors. 
(2) Any right of indemnity which may exist 
under present law. 
(3) Any right to contribution or indemnity 
arising from contract or agreement." 
Section 78-27-42, UTAH CODE ANN., provides: 
"A release by the injured person of one joint 
tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, 
does not discharge the other tort-feasors, unless 
the release so provides, but reduces the claim 
against the other tort-feasors by the greater of: 
(1) The amount of the consideration paid for that 
release; or (2) the amount or proportion by which 
the release provides that the total claim shall 
be reduced.11 
-5-
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Section 78-27-43, UTAH CODE ANN., provides: 
"A release by the injured person of one joint 
tort-feasor does not relieve him from liability to 
make contribution to another joint tort-feasor 
unless that release: 
(a) Is given before the right of the other 
tort-feasor to secure a money judgment for contri-
bution has accrued; and 
(b) Provides for a reduction, to the extent 
of the prorata share of the released tort-feasor, 
of the injured person1s damages recoverable against 
the other tort-feasors.ff 
"This section shall apply only if the issue 
of proportionate fault is litigated between joint 
tort-feasors in the same action.11 
It is clear that, unless there is an exception 
to the rule because defendant-respondent has paid workmen's 
compensation, defendant-respondent is subject to a third-
party action by defendant railroad to determine the propor-
tionate fault of the parties for any injury to plaintiff. 
POINT II. 
THE RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY BETWEEN 
JOINT TORTFEASORS ARE INDEPENDENT, AND NOT DERIVA-
TIVE OF ANY RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFF AGAINST ANY 
TORTFEASOR INDIVIDUALLY. 
The rights of contribution and indemnity between 
joint tortfeasors in Utah are independent of the rights of 
the injured party against either tortfeasor. See §§ 78-27-39, 
78-27-41, 78-27-43 U.C.A. (1953). For example, where the 
-6-
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injured party releases a first joint tortfeasor and has no 
further rights against him, the second tortfeasor would still 
have a right of contribution from the released joint tort-
feasor, unless the release also covered the second tortfeasor. 
Id. The Utah law provides that one joint tortfeasor required 
to pay more than his proportionate share of a judgment shall 
have an independent claim for contribution or indemnity 
against a second joint tortfeasor, notwithstanding the plain-
tiff has no further claim against the second tortfeasor. The 
party seeking contribution in such a case clearly is not 
seeking to enforce any right of the plaintiff, but is en-
forcing his own right not to have to bear more than his 
previously determined share of the judgment. The right to 
contribution or indemnity is individual and not derivative 
of any right of the plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
IF THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT IS BARRED, DEFENDANT 
RAILROAD IS DEPRIVED OF THE RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION 
AND INDEMNITY. 
If defendant-respondent is not subject to suit by 
defendant railroad, obviously defendant railroad loses any 
right of contribution and indemnity against defendant-
respondent, notwithstanding it should appear that the vast 
-7-
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bulk of negligence in the case was imputable to defendant-
respondent. Thus, defendant railroad, or defendant Harmon 
Electronics, might be found to have been merely passively 
negligent in some minor degree, and yet be required to bear 
the entire judgment. In such a case, moreover, defendant-
respondent apparently would have a right, under Section 35-
1-62, Utah Code Ann. (1953), to recoup out of any judgment 
collected the amount of workmen's compensation paid. In 
short, while it might reasonably appear that defendant-
respondent was almost entirely at fault in the matter, 
defendant-respondent would escape any liability whatever, 
and the entire burden of defendant-respondent's fault would 
be cast upon the remaining defendants. 
It is realized that occasionally it is unavoidable 
that a single joint tortfeasor is required to bear the entire 
burden of a judgment, as, for example, where the identity of 
the other tortfeasor is not discoverable, or where he is not 
subject to process. Plaintiff in such cases is permitted to 
take judgment against the one available joint tortfeasor, and 
the result is said not to offend traditional notions of 
justice and fairness because the liability of each joint tort-
feasor to the injured party is said to be whole and entire, 
-8-
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and because it is thought better that the party at least 
partially at fault should have to bear the entire judgment 
than that plaintiff should lose his right to be made whole. 
Such a rationale of necessity, however, has no applicability 
where all of the possible parties at fault are well known 
and where all are readily subject to process. In such a 
case, the fact that the plaintiff's entire right may be 
enforced by joining a single joint tortfeasor, will not 
excuse refusal to enforce the party tortfeasor's rights 
against non-party joint tortfeasors by joining them. 
It may also be pointed out that in the present 
case, failure to join the defendant-respondent may not only 
result in an unfair judgment, but creates a risk of an unfair 
trial. Where a dramatic collision and serious injuries have 
occurred, and an action is permitted to proceed without the 
parties at fault, a predictable desire to redress a dramati-
cally-demonstrated harm may create pressure to fix a doubtful 
liability upon an available defendant. 
POINT IV. 
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AFFECTS THE RIGHTS 
OF EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYER, INTER SE, BUT NOT THE 
RIGHTS OF JOINT TORTFEASORS INTER SE. 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defendant-respondent claims that payment of work-
men's compensation to plaintiff relieves it of any further 
liability in this matter, and bars the Third-Party Complaint 
against it by defendant railroad. Defendant-respondent's 
claim is based upon Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
which provides: 
"The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
the provisions of this title for injuries sustained 
by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, 
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer 
and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer, 
agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities 
of the employer imposed by this act shall be in place 
of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at 
common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next 
of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or 
any other person whomsoever, on account of any accident 
or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, 
aggravated or incurred by such employee in the course 
of or because of or arising out of his employment, and 
no action at law may be maintained against an employer 
or against any officer, agent or employee of the 
employer based upon any accident, injury or death of 
an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall 
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing 
a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for 
compensation in those cases within the provisions 
of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as 
amended.11 
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
defendant-respondent urged below, (1) that the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act provides that compensation thereunder shall 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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be the exclusive remedy against an employer for an injury 
to an employee, and (2) that such employerfs immunity is 
not affected by new Utah statutes providing a right of con-
tribution between joint tortfeasors, since an employer cannot 
be a joint tortfeasor within the meaning of those statutes. 
While it appears that courts of other jurisdictions might 
agree with defendant-respondent, there appear to be no Utah 
cases. 
It may be pointed out with regard to cases from 
other jurisdictions which appear to support defendant-
respondent's view, that in the main enactment of workmenTs 
compensation in those jurisdictions antedates recognition 
of a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, and for 
that reason the usual workmen's compensation law limitation 
of actions against employers is considered a condition upon 
the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. The 
history is exactly reversed in Utah -- the right of contri-
bution antedates the Workmen's Compensation Act -- and the 
reverse conclusion is justified that the right of contribution 
is outside the limitation of actions contained in the Act. 
Described broadly, the Workmen's Compensation Act 
provides an employee, in case of a work-related injury, a 
.'•• -
:
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sure and speedy, though limited, award, in exchange for a 
release of all other claims against the employer based on 
that injury. The employee gives up his common law rights of 
action, but is free in exchange from the uncertainty, expense 
and delay attendant upon enforcing such causes of action. It 
is this exchange of one valuable right for another which makes 
workmen's compensation constitutional. Nothing in this basic 
scheme suggests that it is intended as a device for shifting 
liability for an employer's negligence entirely onto the 
shoulders of third persons t\ho may be responsible for some 
minimal negligence in the matter. Nothing in the Act suggests 
an intent that an employee who has once obtained the benefits 
of a workmen's compensation award and given up all claims 
against the employer, should then be able to obtain from 
third persons full compensation for injuries caused by the 
employer's negligence. The Act, however, plainly has both 
those effects if construed as urged by defendant-respondent. 
No doubt the Workmen's Compensation Act intends 
that once workmen's compensation is paid the employer shall 
be free from liability to, or suit by, the employee, or 
anyone claiming through or under him. See Section 35-1-60, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953). It does not follow that the Act 
-12-
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attempts to settle rights arising in the matter between the 
employer and third persons not claiming through or under 
the injured employee — such as the right of one joint tort-
feasor to have contribution or indemnity from another. 
Recovery on such a third-party right is not the recovery of 
the injured employee or of one standing in his shoes, but 
of the third party injured by an excess recovery against hira* 
Defendant-respondent has urged, however, that under 
the Utah Tort-feasorfs Contribution Act, no right of contri-
bution arises between two joint tortfeasors where one is 
the employer of the injured party. It is claimed that the 
employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor within the definition 
provided by Section 78-27-40, Utah Code Ann. (1953), because 
an employer cannot be "jointly or severally liable in tort 
for the same injury": since an employer's liability to an 
employee is only the statutory one under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, it cannot be joint or several with the liabi-
lity of a third person in tort. The definition of "joint 
tortfeasor" in Section 78-27-40, however, is specifically 
the definition "as used in this section" only. Nothing in 
the remainder of the Act indicates that the term "joint tort-
feasors" as used there has not the more common meaning of two 
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or more persons whose actions jointly contribute to the 
causing of an injury. Indeed, the fact that the Section 78-
27-40 definition is specifically identified as the definition 
"as used in this section11 should be taken to indicate that 
the definition elsewhere in the Act is the more common one. 
The Tort-feasor's Contribution Act deals with the 
rights inter se of persons obligated to the same third person 
for the same tort. Nothing in the Act suggests that it has 
no application where the liability on one side is not the 
full-fledged common law liability but a statutory substitute 
therefore. Unless one of the responsible persons is wholly 
immune, as, for example, where sovereignty is asserted, the 
Contribution Act applies. It is not true that an employer 
cannot be a tortfeasor against his employee; it is only true 
that the employee cannot recover the normal common law 
measure of damages in such a case. So long as the law 
requires that the employer make some remuneration for his 
responsibility to his employee, nothing suggests that he 
should be relieved entirely of his responsibility to joint 
tortfeasors. 
POINT V. 
BOTH THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AND THE TORT-
FEASOR'S CONTRIBUTION ACT CAN BE APPLIED WITH 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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FAIRNESS TO ALL PARTIES. 
It is clearly the law of. Utah, embodied in recently-
enacted statutes (Sections 78-27-39 through 78-27-43, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) (Supp. 1973)), that there shall be a right 
of indemnity or contribution among joint tortfeasors. 
Under those statutes, one joint tortfeasor may not escape a 
duty to contribute to or indemnify another merely because 
he has been released by and escaped liability to the injured 
party. The fact that one joint tortfeasor has paid something 
to the injured party does not release his responsibility to 
another joint tortfeasor, unless the second tortfeasor is 
also released from responsibility to the injured party. The 
new Tort-feasor's Contribution Act contains no exceptions 
where an employer is among the tortfeasors or where the pre-
vious payment to the injured party is workmenfs compensation. 
In order to find such an exception, it would need to be 
clear and unambiguous. Defendant-respondent and the court 
below purport to find such an exception in the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. The relied-upon section of that Act (Section 
35-1-60, Utah Code Ann. (1953)), however, applies only to 
claims by or on behalf of injured employees. It has no 
reference, specifically or impliedly, to a third party right 
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of indemnity, and can have no reference to a right of contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors which did not exist in Utah at 
the time of passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Defendant-respondent proposes that the Workmen's 
Compensation Act be applied to dispose of the claims of both 
plaintiff and defendant railroad against defendant-respondent 
arising out of the subject collision. The Act, however, has 
no specific application to defendant railroad's claim for 
contribution and indemnity. Moreoever, applying the Act to 
release defendant-respondent from the claims for contribution 
has the effect not of disposing of plaintiff's claim against 
his employer, but instead of shifting the burden of that 
claim to the defendant railroad. A fairer resolution, which 
offends neither the Workmen's Compensation Act nor the Tort-
feasor's Contribution Act would be to enforce both the right 
of defendant-respondent to be released from any further 
liability in the matter, and the right of defendant railroad 
not to be burdened with any greater liability than is repre-
sented by its share of negligence in the matter. This result 
could be achieved by ordering that defendant-respondent shall 
remain a defendant for the purpose of determining its percent-
age of negligence in the matter, but providing that proof of 
-16-
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the payment of workmen's compensation according to law shall 
operate to discharge that percentage of any total judgment. 
The release for payment of workmen's compensation would then 
inure to the benefit of all defendants, the remaining de-
fendants being required to satisfy only the remaining percent-
age of the judgment according to their respective percentages 
of negligence. Under the theory of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, plaintiff cannot be hurt by any of this, since he 
has already gained the corresponding benefits of the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the Third District Court granting 
summary judgment to defendant-respondent DeWayne Construction 
Company should be reversed, and the case should be remanded 
to the district court with instructions that DeWayne Construc-
tion Company shall remain a defendant for the purpose of 
determining its percentage of negligence, if any, in causing 
plaintiff's injuries; provided, however, that proof of 
payment by DeWayne Construction Company of workmen's compen-
sation according to law shall satisfy and release as against 
all defendants that percentage of any judgment. 
•-17-
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Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT,_ BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
/ 
E. Craig Smay / J 
Attorneys for/Appellant 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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